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Abstract: While it is generally agreed that democracy
is good in itself, it is not clear that it promotes 
other desirable outcomes such as economic growth. 
This note provides some evidence that democracy 
promotes growth indirectly by Granger causing an 
increase in correlates of high growth —  long life 
expectancy, low fertility and high government educa­
tion expenditure. Since these outcomes are inqportant 
in themselves, this is direct evidence that democracy 
Granger causes an improved physical quality of life.
* I would like to thank Elisabetta Addis, Robert Barro, Ramon 
Marimon and participants in the NBER-CREI conference On Growth 
and Political Institutions and the European University Institute 























































































































































































This paper attempts to measure the effects of democracy on 
indicators of the physical quality of life. This is interesting 
because the issue is important in itself, but also because it 
possible to reconcile conflicting findings on the effect of 
democracy on economic growth. Some authors have found a 
significant positive effect of democracy on growth (Kormendi and 
MeGuire 1985, Knack, Keefer and Olsen 1995, Scully 1988, Weede 
1983). In contrast Barro finds an insignificant negative effect 
of democracy on Economic growth (Barro 1994) in a regression with 
many other explanatory variables. Barro is able to reproduce the 
apparent positive significant effect of democracy on growth by 
excluding some of the other explanatory variables from the 
regression. Thus, it appears that the choice of other 
explanatory variables determines whether democracy is partially 
correlated with high growth. With a parsimonious specification, 
the coefficient on democracy is positive and significant. The 
positive coefficient might be due to omitted variable bias, 
because the coefficient on democracy is not significant and/or 
not positive when other explanatory variables such as Idfe 
expectancy, fertility, education and the rule of law index are 
included in the regression. However, there is an alternative 
explanation of the positive coefficient on democracy in the 
parsimonious specification. It is possible that democracy causes 
high growth indirectly by causing long life expectancy low 
fertility etc.
This note attempts to evaluate these two explanations of 
existing results by testing whether democracy Granger-causes 
indicators of the physical quality of life. I present 
regressions of e.g. log life expectancy on lagged log life 
expectancy the lagged democracy index and other lagged variables.
A positive effect of democracy on life expectancy could be 
explained in several ways. First, of course, most people would 
like life expectancy to be long. -To the extent that democracy 
provides effective incentives to make governments attend to the 
wishes and needs of electors, it should encourage policies which 



























































































Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina and 
Perotti (1993) among others, Democratic governments have an 
incentive to transfer wealth from the average tax-payer to the 
median voter. It is well known that a more equal income 
distribution is associated with longer life expectancy. If the 
egalitarian transfers are in the form of universal education or 
health care, a positive effect of redistribution on life 
expectancy is still more likely. Finally, democracy may reduce 
the risk of a violent change in government, since it increases 
the chance of a non-violent change in government.
On the other hand, democracy might shorten life expectancy 
for many reasons e.g. if it leads to a short term bias, interest 
group paralysis, increased ethnic conflict due to ethnic group 
based parties.
Similar arguments apply to government education expenditures 
and fertility reduction.
Efforts to explain the effect of democracy on life 
expectancy, fertility and education are hampered by the richness 
of the new political economy literature, which presents models 
which could explain any effect. Still more serious is the 
virtual absence of a theory of dictatorship or oligarchy. It is 
as easy to argue that democracy would lead to worse outcomes than 
would a benevolent omniscient omnipotent dictator as it is to 
argue that democracy would lead to better outcomes than would a 
malevolent omniscient omnipotent dictator.
The results suggest that democracy Granger causes long life 
expectancy, low fertility and high government education 
expenditures. In contrast, I find a statistically insignificant 
effect on Government consumption, primary school enrollment and 
secondary school enrollment. Since the apparent statistically 
significant effects of democracy on other variables are all 
associated with rapid economic growth, these results suggest that 
the effect of democracy on growth is underestimated when the 
other variables are included in the regression. Estimated long 
run effects of democracy on life expectancy, fertility and 
government education expenditures are larger than the coefficient 




























































































therefore, tend to support the conclusion that democracy is good 
for growth based on regressions with parsimonious specifications.
The direct evidence on the effects of democracy, and, in 
particular, the evidence that democracy Granger causes long life 
expectancy, is arguably more important than indirect evidence 
that democracy causes rapid economic growth. It is often argued 
that Life expectancy is a better measure of the Physical quality 
of life than per capita GDP.
II Data
All data except for data on inequality were taken from "Data 
set for a Panel of 138 Countries," (Barro and Lee 1994a 1994b) 
which gives definitions and sources. Relevant sections of Barro 
and Lee (1994a) are included as a data appendix. Data on life 
expectancy at birth (Life), the fertility rate, real GDP per 
capita (pcGDP), average number of years of primary or secondary 
schooling completed by women over 25 or by men and women over 25 
are available every 5 years 1960 to 1985 (pyrf and pyr). Data 
on Government education spending are averages over 5 year periods 
e.g. period 1 is 1960 to 1964 and period 2 is 1965 - 1969. 
Sources and definitions of the variables are provided in a data 
appendix.
As in Barro (1994) I use the index of political rights 
assembled by Raymond Gastil and associates for Freedom house as 
an index of democracy. In the Gastil index 1 is the highest 
level of political rights and 7 is the lowest. As in Barro 
(1994) I transform the variable so 0 is the lowest level of 
political rights and 1 is the highest. Excerpt from the Freedom 
House definition of political rights follows -- "Political rights 
enable people to participate freely in the political process ... 
In a free society this means the right of all adults to vote and 
compete for public office, and for elected representatives to 
have a decisive vote on public policies... the survey looks for 
a significant opposition vote . . . freedom from domination by the 
military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 




























































































decentralized ?..." (McColm R. B. 1992). The rating is assigned 
by filling out a detailed checklist then subjectively adjusting 
some ratings. The evaluation is not conducted in the country or 
territory in question. The political rights index is available 
from 1972 on. I use average values over three periods: 72-74,
75-79 and 80-84.
Ill Results
There is strong evidence that a high level of the democracy 
index is associated with rapid growth of life expectancy, even 
when lagged life expectancy is included in the regression.
Cross country differences in Life expectancy are extremely 
persistent. Even first differences in life expectancy are 
persistent. When log life expectancy is plotted against log per 
capita GDP, the scatter is visibly concave suggesting that it 
becomes more difficult to increase life expectancy by a fixed 
proportion as life expectancy becomes high. Therefore the square 
of demeaned lagged log life expectancy that is (Ln(Lifet_5) - 
avg(Ln(Lifet_s) ) )2 is included in the regression. As expected the 
coefficient is negative and strongly significant. I chose to 
reparametrise the model so that the dependent variable is the 
change in log life expectancy (dLifet) . Changes in log life 
expectancy lagged by multiples of 5 years (dLifet_5, dLifet_10 &c) 
were added until the null that a further lag had no effect could 
not be rejected. The democracy index was lagged as well. Log 
Life expectancy was regressed on the democracy index averaged 
over six to ten years earlier or averaged one to five years 
earlier. If the democracy index is lagged six to ten years, 
there are two periods per country 1985 and 1980, while if the 
democracy index is lagged only one to five years the change in 
Log life expectancy between 1970 and 1975 can be used as well. 
In either case the model was estimated by seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) constraining coefficients to be the same in each 
period, but allowing a different constant term for each period.
In preliminary regressions with only one lagged change in 




























































































the coefficient on the lagged democracy index was extremely large 
with a t-statistic over three (results not shown). Inspection 
of the residual scatter revealed a highly influential data point 
-- Iraq in 1980. Iraq was classified by Gastil as not at all 
democratic (7 on the Gastil index 0 on the rescaled democracy 
index). The growth from 1975 to 1980 of Log life expectancy in 
Iraq was very low compared to that expected given other 
explanatory variables. This observation is to be treated with 
particular care since data on life expectancy for Iraq were 
obtained from The UN Demographic Yearbook while data for other 
countries were obtained from World Tables or World Bank (1991) 
(Barro and Lee 1994a). When an indicator variable equal to one 
for Iraq in 1980 and zero otherwise is included in the regression 
its coefficient is extremely significant with a t-statistic under 
-6. Therefore Iraq was excluded from all regressions which 
include life expectancy.
When Iraq is excluded from the regression, the coefficient 
on the lagged democracy index decreases but remains statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of 2.107. Results are reported 
in column one of table I. The estimated long run effect of 
democracy on life expectancy is large, since the ratio of the 
coefficient on the democracy index to the coefficient on lagged 
life expectancy is approximately 0.09. At the sample mean, 
permanently increasing the democracy index by 0.01 (1% of the way 
from complete dictatorship to complete democracy) would 
eventually cause life expectancy to increase by 0.09%. The 
quadratic term in lagged log life expectancy implies that the 
long run effect of an increase in the democracy index would be 
larger for countries with lower than average life expectancy and 
vice versa. This is an extremely large effect, similar to the 
coefficient of log life expectancy on the democracy index in 
simple univariate cross sectional regressions (0.126) and much 
larger than the coefficient on the democracy index in a cross 
sectional regression including log per capita GDP (0.028). This 
is in sharp contrast with the omitted variables bias explanation 
of the association of democracy with rapid economic growth, which 




























































































between democracy and life expectancy due to unobserved country 
characteristics. This argument would imply that the apparent 
long run effect of democracy on life expectancy would be much 
reduced when lagged log life expectancy is included in the 
regression. The result that the estimate of the effect of 
democracy actually becomes larger when lagged log life expectancy 
is included in the regression suggests that the effect of 
democracy on per capita GDP growth is more accurately estimated 
by excluding log life expectancy from the regression than by 
including life expectancy.
Column two of table I shows that the coefficient on the 
democracy index is very slightly increased when current and five 
year lagged log per capita GDP and a further lagged growth rate 
of life expectancy are added to the regression. This is very 
striking since per capita GDP is such an important determinant 
of life expectancy in cross sectional regressions of log life 
expectancy on unlagged variables which do not include lagged log 
life expectancy. Given the very small effect of including a very 
important explanatory variable such as current log per capita GDP 
on the coefficient on the lagged democracy index, it is difficult 
to argue that this coefficient is the result of omitted variable 
bias.
Column three of table I shows that extremely similar results 
are obtained when the basic specification is estimated with the 
democracy index lagged one to five years instead of six to ten. 
Since the democracy index changes rather slowly, the main effect 
of the change in lags is the addition of one more data point per 
country.
Column four includes the square of the democracy index 
lagged one to five years. There is no evidence that the 
relationship is concave. In fact, the point estimate of the 
coefficient on the quadratic term is positive. This, is in 
striking contrast to the non-linear relationship between 
democracy and growth found in Barro (1994). When the democracy 
index is replaced by indicator variables for democracy index < 
0.33 and for 0.33 < than democracy index < 0.67, the coefficient 




























































































coefficient on 0.33 < democracy index < 0.67 (-0.00095). Again 
there is no evidence that the relationship between the democracy 
index and the change in log life expectancy is concave.
There is similarly little evidence that the relationship 
between democracy and life expectancy is different for countries 
at different stages of development. When the product of the 
democracy index and real per capita GDP is included in the 
regression its t-statistic is 0.533. When the product of log per 
capita GDP and the democracy index is included its t-statistic 
is -0.02. There is essentially no evidence that democracy has 
better effects in rich countries than in poor countries or vice 
versa.
As with the democracy index lagged six to ten years, the 
inclusion of current and lagged per capita GDP has almost no 
effect on the coefficient on the democracy index, as shown in 
column five of table I. Finally column six shows the small 
effect of adding the average number of years of primary schooling 
completed by women 25 years old and older lagged for five and for 
ten years as explanatory variables. Again given the small effect 
of inclusion of powerful explanatory variables, it is hard to 
believe that the positive coefficient on the lagged democracy 
index could be due to omitted variable bias.
One way in which democracy could lengthen life expectancy 
is by providing a non-violent means to resolve political conflict 
and achieve transitions in government. Furthermore the Freedom 
House index of political liberties automatically assigns high 
scores (low values of the rescaled democracy index) to countries 
where there is a violent struggle for power. X would be 
unsurprising if a violent struggle for power were associated with 
slow growth of life expectancy. Weak evidence against this 
interpretation of the results in table X is provided in column 
four of table I which shows no evidence that the relationship 
between democracy and a rapid increase in life expectancy is 
concave.
More direct evidence is provided in table II which reports 
regressions which include direct measurements of violent 




























































































coefficient on the lagged democracy index actually increases when 
lagged data on revolutions per year and coups per year are 
included in the regression. The regression reported in column 
three of table II also includes current and lagged logged per 
capita GDP. The coefficient on the lagged democracy index 
remains significant and, again, is larger than the coefficient 
in the regression without data on revolutions and coups (column 
five of table I). These results are evidence against the claim 
that democracy is associated with rapid improvement in life 
expectancy since it is negatively associated with violent 
political struggle.
There are many differences between countries which are not 
directly measured in international data sets. Among the 
consequences are significant coefficients on continent indicator 
variables. Columns one and four of table II show the effects 
of adding indicator variables for East Asia, Latin America, 
Southern Africa and the OECD (all as defined in Barro and Lee 
1984a southern Asia is the excluded group) . Column one shows the 
small effect of adding these variables on the coefficient on the 
lagged democracy index. Since continent indicators pick up a 
large variety of unobserved country characteristics, this is 
evidence against the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
lagged democracy index is caused by omitted variables bias.
Finally column four of table II shows the extremely small 
effect on the coefficient on the lagged democracy index when 
current and lagged log real per capital GDP and female years of 
primary schooling are included in the regression.
Tables I and II report considerable evidence of a beneficial 
effect of democracy on health measured by life expectancy. The 
estimated long run effect of a permanent increase in democracy 
is large -- even larger than the apparent effect in cross 
sectional regressions. This makes it difficult to argue that the 
apparent effect is due to the omission of stable unobserved 
country characteristics which are correlated both with democracy 
and with life expectancy. The lagged life expectancy term should 
pick up such characteristics and drive the apparent effect of 




























































































effects on the democracy coefficient of the addition of per 
capita income and education, which are highly correlated with 
both democracy and long life expectancy, is further striking 
evidence that the relationship is structural.
There is also some evidence that democracy Granger causes 
lower fertility. Differences across countries in fertility are 
highly persistent. Table III reports models estimated by SUR 
with the dependent variable log fertility in 1980 and 1985 or in 
1975 1980 and 1985. Both the coefficients of the log of the 
fertility rate on five and on ten year lagged log fertility are 
very strongly significant in all specifications. The democracy 
index lagged one to five years has a negative and significant 
coefficient of -0.047 with a t-statistic of -2.799 as is shown 
in column one of table III. As with life expectancy, the 
coefficient is virtually unchanged when explanatory variables are 
added to the regression. All regressions reported in table III 
also include the five and ten year lagged log of per capita GDP. 
The coefficient on the democracy index is virtually unaffected 
by the addition of five year lagged and ten year lagged average 
years of primary and of secondary school completed by men or 
women over the age of 25. There is similarly little effect when 
lagged schooling of women is included. Fifteen year lagged log 
fertility has an insignificant coefficient and, again, virtually 
no effect on the democracy coefficient.
When the democracy index lagged six to ten years is used 
instead of the democracy index lagged one to five years the 
coefficient falls by half and becomes statistically 
insignificant. This is largely due to the fact that only two 
observations per country can be used, and the fact that fewer 
countries are dropped due to missing values. This is shown by 
re-estimating the original specification with the reduced sample. 
Results are shown for comparison in columns three and four of 
table III.
Since estimates of the effect of democracy on fertility are 
strongly significant when the largest available sample is used 
and since the coefficient is little affected by additional 




























































































causes lower fertility. Again this would be an indirect path 
from democracy to rapid per capita GDP growth.
If democracy causes long life expectancy and low fertility 
one would expect that it does so via government policy, not 
because of the act of voting itself. Unfortunately, the Barro 
and Lee (1994a,1994b) data set contains relatively little 
information on government policy, principally on components of 
government spending. I consider the ratio of nominal total 
government education expenditures to nominal GDP (GEETOT), the 
ratio of nominal recurrent government education expenditures to 
nominal GDP (GEEREC), the ratio of real government consumption 
expenditures to real GDP (G0VSH5), Government consumption net of 
defence and education (GVXDXE), and the ratio of Nominal 
government consumption to nominal GDP (GOVWB). All these data 
are averages over five year periods. Also considered were 
primary and secondary school enrollment rates which reflect both 
government and private choices. All of these data were taken 
from Barro and Lee (1994a) as were the notes on definitions and 
sources which are presented in the data appendix.
There is considerable evidence that democracy affects 
government education expenditures and in particular recurrent 
government education expenditures. The evidence that democracy 
Granger causes a high ratio of total government education 
expenditure (GEETOT) to GDP is borderline statistically 
significant as is shown in table IV. As always lagged GEETOT is 
included in the regression. Since all government spending 
variables are averages over five year periods, the democracy 
index is lagged one five year period as are the lagged spending 
variables. Other explanatory variables are measured five years 
before the beginning of the period. Column two of table IV shows 
a borderline significant coefficient of 0.006 with a t statistic 
of 1.99 when only lagged GEETOT lagged log fertility and the 
lagged democracy index are included in the regression. Columns 
one and three show the small effect of including lagged 
log(pcGDP) and of adding GEETOT lagged two periods.
Similar regressions were estimated with primary and with 




























































































has an insignificant positive coefficient in the primary school 
enrollment rate regression and an insignificant negative 
coefficient in the secondary school enrollment rate regression 
(results not shown).
In contrast to the fairly weak evidence that democracy is 
associated with high total government education expenditure and 
mixed very weak evidence of effects on enrollment, there is quite 
strong evidence that democracy is associated with high recurrent 
government expenditure. Columns four through six of table IV 
report large and strongly statistically significant positive 
coefficients on the lagged democracy index. A comparison of the 
columns shows the very small effects of additional explanatory 
variables. It is possible that the evidence that democracy 
Granger causes high recurrent government education expenditure 
is stronger because data are available for more countries. It 
is also possible that the evidence is stronger because recurrent 
expenditures are more predictable and less influenced by 
population growth. Overall the evidence that democracy Granger 
causes high government education expenditures is quite strong.
A positive effect of democracy on government education 
expenditure could help to explain the positive coefficient on the 
democracy index in parsimonious growth regressions (Kormendi and 
MeGuire 1985, Knack, Keefer and Olsen 1995, Scully 1988, Weede 
1983). Such an effect could also help to explain the apparent 
positive effect on life expectancy and the apparent negative 
effect on fertility reported in tables I, II and III.
There is almost no evidence that democracy is associated 
with high government consumption in general. Table V reports 
three regressions of government consumption on log(pcGDP), the 
unlagged democracy index and (as always) a period specific 
constant. Two of three coefficients on the democracy index are 
negative and one -- with G0VSH5 as the dependent variable -- is 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of -2.265. When 
lagged government consumption is included in the regressions none 
of the coefficients on the democracy index are statistically 
significant and one is negative. There is essentially no 




























































































democracy is associated with high government consumption in 
general.
IV Conclusions
There is fairly strong evidence that democracy Granger 
causes long life expectancy, low fertility and High government 
education expenditures. High levels of political rights 
(democracy) as measured by Gastil and followers are associated 
with long life expectancy, low fertility and high government 
education expenditures. These partial correlations are not 
eliminated when lagged dependent variables and other lagged data 
are included along with the lagged democracy index.
This evidence suggests that democracy causes increased 
physical quality of life. It also suggests that democracy has 
an indirect positive effect on economic growth. The apparent the 
long run effect of democracy on these other variables is 
generally larger than the coefficient on democracy in cross 
sectional regressions. This suggests that parsimonious 
regressions excluding life expectancy, fertility and government 
education expenditures give a more accurate estimate of the 
effect of democracy on economic growth than do regressions which 
include these variables. Thus these results suggest that 
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All data and quotes from Barro and Lee 1984a. All data via Barro 
and Lee 1984a.
The data set contains variables for the panel estimation. 
Data are presented either quinquennially for the years 1960-1985, 
i.e., 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985, or for averages of 
five years' sub-periods over 1960-1985. The term XX behind a 
variable denotes a specific year (for example, P60 is the primary 
school enrollment ratio in 1960), while the term X denotes 
average of a sub-period among the five year sub-periods: 1960-64, 
1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79,and 1980-84 for the averaged variables
(e.g. INV3 denotes average investment rate during 1970-74).
For the data sources, references are abbreviated as follows:
BANKS : Banks, A.S., "Cross-National Time Series Data 
Archive", Center for Social Analysis, State 
University of New York at Binghampton, September 
1979, updated.
BARRO and LEE : Barro R. and J. Lee, "International Comparisons 
of Educational Attainment," NBER Working Paper, 1993.
GASTIL : Freedom in the World, various years
GFS : IMF, Government Financial Statistics, various issues
IFS : IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues
SH v.5.5 : Summers.R and A. Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 
5.5)” (Dataset on Floppies)
SIPRI : SIPRI Yearbooks, various issues.
UN : United Nations, Global Estimates and Projections of
Population bv Sex and Age, the 1990 Assessment, 1991.
(Dataset on Floppies)
UNESCO : UNESCO, Statistical Yearbooks , various issues.
WB : World Bank, World Tables, various editions.
WDR : World Bank, World Development Report Data Set, 1991. 
Variables
pcGDPxx is Real GDP per capita (1985 international prices) from 
SH v.5.5. (xx = 65, 70, 75, 80, 85)
Years of Primaryxx is the average years of primary schooling in 
the total population over age 25. The source is BARRO and LEE
Female Years of Primaryxx is Average years of primary schooling 




























































































Years of secondaryxx is the average years of secondary schooling 
in the total population over age 25. Source : BARRO and LEE
Female Years of Secondaryxx is the average years of secondary 
schooling in the female population over age 25. The source is 
BARRO and LEE
Fertilityxx is the total fertility rate (children per woman). 
The source is WB.
LIFExx is the life expectancy at age 0. The sources are WDR, WB 
except For the following countries, LIFExx came from 
Iran : UN Demographic Yearbook for 1960,65. World Tables.
Iraq : UN Demographic Yearbook.
Taiwan : Taiwan Statistical Yearbook. Average of male and 
female life expectancy.
GOVSH5x is the Ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure 
to real GDP. (Period average) from SH v.5.5.
(x = 3, 4 and 5)
GOVWBx is the ratio of nominal government "consumption" 
expenditure to nominal GDP (using current local currency). The 
source is WB .
GDEx is the ratio of nominal government expenditure on defense 
to nominal GDP. The source is GFS, SIPRI see notes in Barro and 
Lee 1984a.
GEERECx is the ratio of recurring nominal government expenditure 
on education to nominal GDP. The source is UNESCO.
GEETOTx is the ratio of total nominal government expenditure on 
education to nominal GDP. The source is UNESCO.
Data on Taiwan's education expenditure come from Taiwan 
Statistical Yearbook.
GVXDXE5x Ratio of real government "consumption" expenditure net 
of spending on defense and on education to real GDP, sourced from 
SH v.5.5. (GVXDXE=GOVSH5-GDE-GEEREC) see notes in Barro and Lee 
1984a. Since total government consumption and defence/education 
expenditures are differently measured, net government consumption 
ratios are negative for some countries. For these cases, Barro 
and Lee assumed 0.01.
COUPx is the number of coups per year. The source is BANKS.
REVOLx is the number of revolutions per year. The source is 
BANKS.
POLRIGHTx is the index of political rights (from 1 to 7; l=most 





























































































Table I Political Rights and Life Expectancy 
Dependent variable
Change in Log Life Expectancy 1965 - 1980 & 1980 - 1975 & 1975-1970
no. 113 109 113 113 108 88
R2 1985 0.79 0.80 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.76
R2 1980 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.77































(Log(Life. 5)- -0.065 
Mean,_5)2 (-4.703)
-0.074 -0.035 -0.037 -0.041 -0.039
(-4.890) (-3.194) (3.200) (-3.549) ( -2.404)












































t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions also contain a period 
specific constant term which is not reported. Source "A data set for a 
panel of 138 countries” by Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee 1994. Iraq is 




























































































Table il Political Rights and Life Expectancy II 
Dependent var:. change in Log Life Expectancy 1985 -1980 &1980 -1975 &1975-1970
no. 108 108 103 8 6
R2 1985 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.79
R2 1980 0.70 0.69 0 .6 8 0.77
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OECD 0.0008
(0.515)





















































































































Table III Political Rights and Fertility
Dependent variable: Log Fertility rate 1985,1980 and 1975
no. 93 83 107 107 103 83
R2 1985 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
R2 1980 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
R2 1975 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
see 1985 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
see 1980 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
see 1975 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Corr 85-80 0.15 0.20 0.32 0.31 0.08 0.18
Corr 80-75 -0.42 -0.40 -0.43 -0.38
Corr 85-75 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.05
Log(Fertility 1.453 1.402 1.245 1.246 1.485 1.397
Rate,.5) (33.610) (28.030) (24.641) (24.727) (32.350) (28.164)
Log(Fertility -0.502 -0.442 -0.262 -0.266 -0.593 -0.435
Rate,.10) (-11.599) (-8.842) (-5.106) (-5.199) (-7.986) (-8.713)
Log(Fertility 0.062
Ratet,15) (1.286)
Democracy -0.047 -0.048 -0.036 -0.048 - 0.051
lndextM _5 (-2.799) (-2.281) (-1.558) (-2.854) (-2.411)
Democracy -0.022
lndex,.6_10 (-1.004)
Log(GDP,.5) -0.065 -0.076 -0.068 -0.065 -0.066 -0.076
(-2.901) (-2.731) (-2.605) (-2.485) (2.965) (-2.759)
Log(GDPt_i0) 0.042 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.044 0.051
(1.851) (1.898) (1.962) (1.947) (1.921) (1.834)
Years of -0.036 -0.038*
Primary,^ (-2.070) (-2.407)
Years of 0.039 0.041*
Primary,.., o (2.144) (2.493)
Years of 0.009 0.015*
Secondary,^ (1.179) (1.851)
Years of -0.008 -0.009*
Secondary,.,,) (-1.124) (-1.372)
t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions also contain a period 
specific constant term which is not reported. Source "A data set for a 
panel of 138 countries" by Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee 1994.




























































































Table IV Political Rights and Government Education Expenditure 
Dependent variable: Government Education Expenditures 5 & 4
Total Total Total Recurrent Recurrent Recurrent
no. 91 95 87 101 105 98
R2 5 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.65 0.66 0.70
R2 4 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.80
see 5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
see 4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01























































t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions also contain a period 
specific constant term which is not reported. Source "A data set for a 
panel of 138 countries" by Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee 1994. 
Period 4 is 1975-80 period 5 is 1980-85. Lag is one period or 5 years 




























































































Table V Political Rights and Government Consumption Expenditure
Dependent variable:Government Consumption Ratio 5, 4 and 3
Real - Defence and Educ1 Real2 Nominal3
no. 95 104 121 121 106 108
R2 5 0.81 0.37 0.77 0.26 0.75 0.01
R2 4 0.87 0.33 0.79 0.21 0.76 0.02
R2 3 0.87 0.30 0.87 0.17 0.77 0.03
see 5 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 003 0.06
see 4 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05
see 3 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05
Corr 5-4 -0.08 0.82 -0.08 0.85 -0.01 0.86
Corr 4-3 0.12 0.90 0.23 0.86 0.17 0.87
Corr 5-3 -0.14 0.72 -0.16 0.72 -0.10 0.74
Government 0.861 0.877 0.915
consum. lag (31.820) (34.788) (30.506)
Democracy 0.007 0.019 -0.010 -0.035 0.001 -0.007
Index (0.891) (1.263) (-1.293) (-2.265) (0.164) ( -0.503)
Log(GDP) -0.009 -0.043 -0.006 -0.025 0.002 0.007
(-3.504) (-7.382) (-2.266) (-4.319) (0.777) ( 1.268)
t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions also contain a period 
specific constant term which is not reported. Source "A data set for a 
panel of 138 countries" by Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee 1994. 
Government consumption net of education and defence. Democracy index 
unlagged. GDP at end of period.
1. gvxdxe -- real government consumption to real GDP (Penn W.T. mark 5.5) 
- ratio of nominal defence and education spending to nominal GDP.
2. Real Government consumption to real GDP (Penn W.T. mark 5.5)
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